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SUPREME COURT REVIEW:
CHURCHISTATE
JURISPRUDENCE

WILLIAM BENTLEY BALL*

INTRODUCTION

The following is an overview of current moral and ethical
issues faced by the Supreme Court, issues that are important
and central to our faith. One must first consider two wings of
the Constitution which have prompted much religious litigation:
the Free Exercise Clause' and the Establishment Clause.2
Father Richard John Neuhaus has always insisted that the
distinction between these clauses is false and that they are
Mr. Ball, with Ball, Skelly, Murren & Connell, Harrisburg,
PA, has appeared in
ten religious liberty cases before the United States Supreme Court. He is the author
of MERE CREATURES OF THE STATE? EDUCATION RELIGION AND THE COURTS (Crisis

Books, 1994).
The Free Exercise Clause provides, in relevant part, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. This clause permits the individual to exercise his or her own
beliefs, without fear of governmental interference. The government cannot prescribe
its own preference to any one religion, or force belief or disbelief in any religion.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
2 The Establishment Clause reads, in relevant part, "Congress shall
make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. Const. amend. I. This has been
interpreted by the Court to prohibit the establishment of state religion or active
government involvement in the affairs of religion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 668 (1970); see infra note 147. Furthermore, a state may not aid one religion or
prefer one religion over another. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15. The Clause is applied to
the several states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 8.
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really a single clause serving religious liberty. This problem will
surface in examining current case law: the possible breaking
down of the notion of a "naked public square" about which
Father Neuhaus has written.4
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Violation of a religion-based free exercise claim is
determined by the test set forth in Wisconsin v. Yoder." The test
contains four prongs: (1) The religious claimant must first prove
a sincere and basic religious claim. 6 (2) The religious claimant
must then prove that there has been injury to religious
practice-injury to free exercise of religion.! (3) The burden of
proof then shifts to government.8 The government is required to
show a compelling state interest. Such a showing requires more
3 See Richard J. Neuhaus, A New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 620, 627 (1992).
4 RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (1984). "The naked public square is the result of political doctrine and
practice that would exclude religion and religiously grounded values from the
conduct of public business." Id. at vii.
' 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevent a state from forcing Amish parents to enroll their children,
once having passed the eighth grade, in high school until the government-imposed
age of 16. Id. at 234. Chief Justice Burger, writing the majority opinion, held that a
state's interest in universal education is not absolute and must be balanced with
other fundamental individual rights and freedoms, including the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the freedom of parents to teach their religious
values to their children. Id. at 214.
6 Id. at 215. "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on
purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the
claims must be rooted in religious belief." Id. The defendant was able to show that
his claim was not a matter of purely personal preference but deep religious
conviction. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. The Old Order Amish was an organized group
whose daily life was interrelated to their interpretation of the Bible. Id.
7 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205, 218.
The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of
the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin
law ... compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts
undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs .... It
carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of
religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.
Id. at 218.
" Id. at 221. "Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake ... [the
court] must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its
requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption." Id. at
221.
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than merely demonstrating a public interest in its action.9 In
other words, a supreme societal interest must be at stake. (4)
Even if a compelling state interest is plainly present and proved,
the government must still show that its action is the least
restrictive means of achieving this goal.1 ° These points are
stressed because they have become obscured by many decisions
since Yoder.
In Goldman v. Weinburger," the military forbade an Air
Force officer, who was also a Jewish rabbi, from wearing a
yarmulke on duty. The Supreme Court held that the military
could forbid this action without violating the officer's right to
freely exercise his religion. 13 The question that Goldman posed
was not whether it was right or wrong for the military to
exercise its discipline in that matter, but whether the Court
should have required the government to prove that its action was
necessitated by a compelling societal interest (a matter which
might have been relatively easy to prove).1 4 However, the Court
paid no attention to the Yoder analysis of free exercise claims.s
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 16
involved the governmental use of sacred Indian land for
harvesting timber and for building a highway.17 The tribes
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221-22.

'0 Id. at 221.

[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can
accept it as settled, ... however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests.
Id. at 215.
" 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
'2 Id. at 503. The officer sued the Secretary of Defense claiming that the
regulation forbidding wearing of his yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion. Id.
's Id. at 509-10. The Supreme Court held that the military regulations were
entitled to greater judicial deference than their civilian counterparts because they
must accomplish their mission in fostering "instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment and esprit de corps." Id. at 507.
14 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-07. The Court held that the standard of
review for a
First Amendment case involving a military regulation was neither a strict scrutiny
nor a rational basis test, but rather that of "great" deference to the judgment of
military authorities. Id. "[J]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative
action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make
rules and regulations for their governance is challenged." Id. at 508.
'5
16

Id. at 506-07.
485 U.S. 439 (1988).

17 Id.

at 439. Three American Indian tribes sued the Forest Service to enjoin it
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contended that the burden on their religious practices was
substantial enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless
the government could show a compelling need for the completion
of the road or the harvesting of the timber.'
The Court,
however, ruling against a free exercise claim, held that the
compelling state interest test was not applicable.' 9 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, seemed to hold that free
exercise is violated only where the government coerces one in
one's own religious beliefs. 20
This is a much broader
interpretation of what free exercise had been understood to
mean.
These decisions departed from the law set forth in Yoder,
and signaled a decline in our religious liberty jurisprudence.
Finally, in Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,21 the Yoder test
from cutting down trees and constructing roads in a northwest California national
forest traditionally used for religious purposes by plaintiffs. Id. at 443.
18 Id. at 447.
"Id. at 448.
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with
the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not
insist that [plaintiffs] engage in any set form of religious observance, so
[they] may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious
practices by refraining from [an action] .... The Free Exercise Clause
affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental
compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of
the Government's internal procedures.
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448; Bo-'en v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding federal statute
requiring states to use social security numbers in welfare program did not conflict
with plaintiffs' religious beliefs).
20 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 448. The Supreme Court held that incidental effects of
governmental action which may interfere with the plaintiffs practice of religion, but
which do not coerce the individual into acting contrary to his religion, do not require
the government to show a compelling justification for its otherwise legitimate
actions. Id. at 450-51. While the destruction of plaintiffs' sacred sites may make it
difficult for them to practice their religion, the Court noted that the Forest Service
fairly planned its construction to minimize the destruction of sacred Indian grounds.
Id. at 454. Most importantly, the First Amendment cannot require the individual to
exact burdens from the government to aid it in its free exercise. Id. at 451-52.
Forcing the government to forgo use of its own land would be such an affirmative
act. Id. at 454. Comparing Lyng to Bowen, Justice O'Connor held that the Indians
would not "be coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious
beliefs; nor would ... governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any
person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
21 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding Free Exercise Clause
allows state to prohibit
sacramental drug use, thus allowing denial of employee benefits to persons
discharged for such use). Respondents were dismissed from employment with a
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was expressly discarded. 2 The substituted rule became that any
governmental action claimed to burden religion would be upheld
if it was generally applicable and religiously neutral in its
terms.23 Jesse Choper, the constitutional scholar, would now
describe Yoder as the high water mark of our religious liberty
jurisprudence because a nadir had been reached in Smith.24 The
downhill trend was vigorously protested, 25 and restoration of the
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a controlled
substance, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church.
Id. at 874. When respondents applied for unemployment compensation, they were
found to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related
misconduct. Id. Respondents contended that this denial violated their free exercise
rights under the First Amendment. Id.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding denial of unemployment
benefits to woman refusing to accept job requiring her to work on Sabbath violated
her sincerely held religious beliefs). Under Sherbert, governmental action that
substantially burdens a religious practice must be justified by a "compelling"
governmental interest. Id. at 406-09. See also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (holding that denial of unemployment benefits to applicant whose religion
forbade him to make weapons violated his religious beliefs).
22

494 U.S. at 882-83.

We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord
with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the (Sherbert) test
inapplicable to such challenges. The government's ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability
to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development."
Id. at 885.
Id. at 879.
2 See Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 944-46 (1986).
The Supreme Court's most significant doctrinal pronouncement has come
with respect to neutral, secular laws that regulate action. When the impact
of such regulations conflicts with the tenets of a particular religion, by
requiring persons to do something that their religion prohibits or by
forbidding them from doing something that their religion demands, the
Burger Court has found an abridgment of religious liberty unless the
government satisfies what, essentially, is a test of "strict scrutiny." Unless
the government can show an overriding, substantial, compelling, or
important interest that cannot be achieved by some narrower, alternative
means, the individual is constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the
regulation.
Id. at 944-45. In Yoder, "[w]eighing all the circumstances, the Court held that the
State's interest was not strong enough to require the Amish to engage in conduct
that was contrary to their religious beliefs." Id. at 945.
See also Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution:
Similaritiesand Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1994); Jesse H. Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools - an Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5
(1987).
2' See Dale E. Carpenter, Free Exercise and Dress Codes: Toward more Consistent
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compelling state interest-least restrictive means test was
demanded.26
In response, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
27
("RFRA") was introduced in Congress.
The RFRA restores the
2
8
Yoder test, however, it does contain one wrinkle that may
become problematic. The second part of the four-part Yoder test
required proof of injury to religion. 29 The RFRA states that
governmental action may not "substantially" burden religious
exercise.3 0 The word "substantially" is going to spawn a great
deal of litigation. It qualifies the language that had originally
been in the Act - simply a flat-out statement that the
government may not burden religion.3 1
The addition of
Protection of a Fundamental Right, 63 IND. L.J. 601 (1988); Allison J. Cornwell,
ConstitutionalLaw - Free Exercise Clause - Sacrificial Rites Become Constitutional
Rights on the Altar of Babalu Aye, 16 U. ARK LITTLE ROCK L.J. 623 (1994);
Kathleen P. Kelly, Abandoning the Compelling Interest Test in Free Exercise Cases:
Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 929 (1991); Kenneth
Marin, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State of Free
Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1431 (1991); Sharon W. Murphy, Free Exercise
of Religion: A Luxury our Nation Can No Longer Afford Employment Division v.
Smith, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 435 (1991).
2

See Carpenter, supra note 25; Cornwell, supra note 25; Kelly, supra note 25.
1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1995).
the compelling interest test as set forth in

27 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
28 The purpose of the Act is "[tio restore

Sherbert v. Verner ...
and Wisconsin v. Yoder ...and to guarantee its application in

all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened ..." Id. at §2000bb
(b)(1). For an excellent analysis of the Act, see Mark E. Chopko, Religious Access to
Public Programs and Governmental Funding, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 645 (1992).

But see Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the
Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247 (1994) (suggesting that RFRA may
be unconstitutional and that language of RFRA leaves room for restrictive
interpretation); cf. Keith Jaasma, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Responding to Smith; Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 211 (1995)

(examining congressional response to Smith through enactment of RFRA).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
20 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1995). The Act
reads:
(a) In general.
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
139 CONG. REC. S14350 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993).
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"substantially" now places in the hands of judges an accordionlike power by which they can explore the degree of any claimed
injury. I am certain that this problem can be solved by the
creation of extensive factual records at trial.
The first religious liberty decision which the Court
announced during its 1993 term was Church of Lukumi Babalu
3 s Lukumi involved a church which
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.
practiced Santeria, the ritual sacrifice of animals.33 The animals
would be killed, cooked, and eaten for the religious inspiration of
the faithful.34 Some citizens of Hialeah were not pleased when
they heard that a Santeria church was going to be founded in
their midst, and the city eventually passed four restrictive
ordinances. 35 Violations of each of the ordinances were
punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both.36 The Church sued,
claiming violations of their rights under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.37 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, the holding of Smith was still the law and the
RFRA had not yet been enacted. s The hope was that the
Supreme Court would seize this case, use it as a vehicle for
overruling Smith,
and in the process restore the compelling state
39
interest test.

Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, held the Hialeah
ordinances unconstitutional.
The Court first noted that the
ordinances were not religiously neutral, but religiously onesided: 41 they targeted a specific church and its religious
32

113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).

3Id. at 2219.
Id. at 2219-20.
1Id.
at 2223. Resolution 87-66 proposed banning religious practices inconsistent
with public morals, peace, or safety. Id. Ordinance 87-40 broadly punished
"[wihoever ...
unnecessarily or cruelly ...
kills any animal," including such killings
for religious ceremonies. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223. Ordinance 87-52 prohibited the
sacrifice of an animal in a ritual. Id. at 2224. Ordinance 87-71 prohibited the
sacrifice of animals. Id. Ordinance 87-72 prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned

for cattle. Id.
36Id.
37Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2223. Petitioners filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983

alleging violation of their rights under the First Amendment. Id.
38 The case was argued on November 4, 1992, and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was enacted in 1993.
"8See, e.g., Cornwell, supra note 25, at 623.

40Lukumi, 113 S.Ct. at 2220. The Court concluded that the laws in question were
enacted contrary to free exercise principles and were therefore void. Id. at 2234.
4' Id. at 2220. The Court noted that when the objective of the law is to restrict
practices based upon their religious motivation, the law is not neutral. Id. at 2227.
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practices. The Court also determined that the ordinances were
not legislation of general applicability, 43 but legislation aimed at
a religious practice of which the City disapproved. 4 Having
concluded that the ordinances were not religiously neutral
statutes of general application,45 the Court was in a position to
examine Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith to determine what
could be found there to protect the church.46
47
The Court utilized the compelling state interest test,
reasoning that since Smith was limited to religiously neutral
action of general application by government, it did not embrace a
The Court reviewed the record and concluded that the object of the City of Hialeah's
ordinances was to suppress the "central element of the Santeria worship service ..."
Id. Considering the words of the ordinances, the operation of the ordinances, and
the events preceding the enactment of the ordinances, the Court concluded the
ordinances were not neutral. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2226-31. The Court emphasized
the fact that the ordinances tested the necessity of killing animals and valued nonreligious more than religious reasons. Id. at 2229.
42 Id. at 2227-31. Evidence that the ordinances targeted the Santeria
religion
included the design of the laws to proscribe religious killings of animals through
Santeria practice but excluded almost all other types of animal killings. Id. at 2228.
In addition, the fact that the ordinances suppressed more religious conduct than
necessary to achieve their stated aims of protecting the public morals, peace, and
safety of the community, indicates the ordinances targeted the Santeria practices.
Id. at 2229-30. Finally, the ordinances' overbroad language prohibited all Santeria
sacrifice even while legitimate governmental aims could be addressed through
narrower restrictions. Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2230.
4' Id.
at 2232-33. Laws burdening a religious practice must be of general
applicability. Id. at 2232. The principles the ordinances seek to advance, protecting
public health and preventing cruelty to animals, are underinclusive to meet those
ends. Id. "[The ordinances] fail to prohibit non-religious conduct that endangers
these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does. The
underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential." Id.
"See supra note 40. The ordinances the city enacted did not ban the killing of
animals in general, but rather outlawed Santeria sacrifice specifically. Lukumi, 113
S. Ct. at 2232-33. Under the City's ordinances, animals could still be killed for food,
to eliminate pests, and for euthanasia purposes. Id. However, the religious killing of
animals in the manner prescribed by the Santeria religion was banned. Id. In
addition, the ordinances do not regulate the secular disposal of carcasses, as
hunters were not prohibited from bringing their game to their homes, but rather
targets the disposal of sacrificial animals. Id. Moreover, the City prohibited
slaughtering animals in the Santeria practice but did not prohibit the slaughtering
of animals for commercial purposes. Id.
45 See supra note
40.
"Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233. Once the Court found that the ordinances were not
neutral and not of general application, it scrutinized the ordinances' state interests.
Id.
47 Id. Once a law fails to meet the requirements set forth in Employment
Div.,
Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court
should apply the "compelling interest standard." Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233.
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situation such as Lukumi, in which religion was targeted.48 In
evaluating the law, the Court subjected the ordinances to strict
scrutiny and determined that they were not narrowly tailored to
achieve any governmental interests.49
Argued almost at the same time of the Lukumi case, was
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist.5 °
Lamb's Chapel involved a Long Island school district which had
a policy that allowed various groups to use the school's premises
for after-hours educational and social programs.5 1 A Christian
group wanted to hold a program dealing with family life and
child rearing, using materials supplied by Dr. James Dobson, the
famous evangelist. 52 The school district denied the group's
request. 53 In June of 1993, the Supreme Court held the school

district's actions unconstitutional.54
Many hoped that the Court would overrule Smith and reestablish the Yoder test. But the Court neatly sidestepped the
religious issue, and held the district's actions unconstitutional on

Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2233-34. The Court distinguished this case from Smith by
commenting on the Hialeah ordinances' effect of targeting religious conduct for
distinctive treatment apart from legitimate governmental interests. Id.
'9Id. at 2234. In fact, the Court stated that all four ordinances were overbroad or
underinclusive because they failed to prohibit analogous non-religious conduct and
instead greatly burdened religion. Id. The Court passionately concluded that
"[legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute
or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here were ..." Id.
50Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
"' Id. at 2144. Pursuant to § 414 of the New York Education Law (McKinney 1988
& Supp.1993), school boards may regulate the after hours use of school property for
ten specified purposes. Id. at 2143-44. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
determined that the permitted uses do not include meetings for religious purposes.
Id. at 2144. The School District's school board established rules and regulations in
accordance with these rulings. Id. The rules allowed "social, civil, or recreational
uses" of school property, as well as use by political organizations consistent with
New York State law. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144. However, the rules also
specifically provided that the school premises should not be used for religious
purposes. Id. at 2144.
52 Id. Dr. Dobson is described as a "psychologist, former associate
clinical
professor of pediatrics..., best-selling author, and radio commentator." Id. The
Lamb's Chapel evangelical church applied to the school board to show a film series
containing lectures made by Dr. Dobson concerning family life from a Christian
perspective. Id. at 2144-45.
53Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2145.
' Id. at 2149. The Court held that the school district violated the First
Amendment by denying the Lamb's Chapel evangelical church access to school
property to show a film series on family life, solely because the film dealt with the
subject from a religious perspective. Id. at 2147-48.
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freedom of speech grounds. 5 Although the outcome was a
positive one, the Court avoided a stronger statement of free
exercise law. It will be very interesting to see how the Court will
treat the next major religious liberty case that comes before it in
light of the RFRA.
The RFRA is aimed directly at the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States. 56 It is
likely that the Court will observe what Congress has mandated.
However, the Court may be conscious of a problem regarding the
separation of powers. 7 Since a majority of this Court wrote the
Smith decision, there may be a feeling on the part of some of
the justices, including Justice Scalia, that Congress may not
legislate as to the standard of constitutional review for such
cases. This inevitable tension between the two branches will be
exciting to watch.
A third case which warrants discussion is EEOC v.
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate.59 This case is not now
before the Supreme Court, as certiorari has been denied6.
Nevertheless, the case still provokes some interesting thoughts.
56Id. at 2144. The Court defined the central issue as whether "itviolates'the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment ...to deny a church access to school
premises to exhibit for public viewing and for assertedly religious purposes, a film
dealing with family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today." Id. The Court
noted the Church's argument that the school district's restrictions on subject matter
or speakers presented on district property were required to be "justified by a
compelling state interest and to be narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Lamb's
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2144. However, the Court decided not to rule on that issue. Id.
at 2147. See also John E. Burgess, Comment, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993): A Critical Analysis of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudencein the Context of Public Schools,
47

VAND.

L. REV.

1939, 1943-44

(1994) (stating that Supreme

Court had

opportunity, through Lamb's Chapel, to clarify existing constitutional models of
church-state interaction, but instead it decided case on questionable free speech
grounds).
56 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. In the RFRA, Congress states that
the Supreme Court in Smith "virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral towards
religion .... " Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1995).
" See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994) (discussing
Congress' attempt to create standards to protect exercise of religion instead of just
returning important issues to courts).
'" Five of the justices that joined in the majority opinion in Smith currently sit on
the Supreme Court. They include Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Stevens, Kennedy, and
O'Connor. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
" 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 439 (1993).
'0 114 S. Ct. 439 (1993).
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In the 1880's, a very wealthy Hawaiian land owner created two
schools in her will, a school for boys and a school for girls. 6' The
will provided that only Protestant teachers could be hired by the
schools.62 A young teacher saw an advertisement for a French
language instructor at the schools, contacted the schools, and
was denied the position because she was not of Protestant faith.63
She complained to the EEOC,64 and the case made its way to the
Ninth Circuit. 65 The Court of Appeals declined to follow the
district court and held that the schools did not fall within any of
the three religious exemptions provided in Title VII. 66 The
6'Kamehameha

Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 459. The pertinent provisions

of the will stated that the bulk of the land owner's estate should be placed in a
"trust to erect and maintain in the Hawaiian Islands two schools, ... one for boys
and one for girls, to be known as, and called, the Kamehameha Schools." Id.
6 Id. The will commands that "the teachers of [the Kamehameha Schools] shall
forever be persons of the Protestant religion." Id.
6 Id. at 459.
614
Ms. Edgerton filed a charge of religious discrimination with the EEOC.
Kamehameha School/Bishops Estate, 990 F.2d at 459.
65 The EEOC filed suit in district court alleging religious discrimination in
employment in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),
which makes it illegal to deny employment to an individual based on "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin[.]" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995)). The
schools sought to bring themselves within the exemptions afforded in the Act, and
the district court below found the schools exempt on all the grounds in the Act, and
granted summary judgment for the Schools. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop
Estate, 780 F. Supp. 1317 (D. Haw. 1991). The Ninth Circuit then reviewed the
district court's grant of summary judgment on appeal. Kamehameha
Schools / Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 460.
66 Id. The pertinent Title VII exemptions are as follows:
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) provides:
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) provides:
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees ...on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) states:
to
[Ilt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school ...
is,
hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school ...
in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or
managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious
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applicant, therefore, had been discriminated against on account
of her religious beliefs.67
What makes the case especially interesting is the fact that
about eighty Catholic and Protestant colleges throughout the
country joined in an amicus curiae brief in support of the school's
petition for certiorari. 68 The amici claimed that if the Ninth
Circuit's ruling were to stand, the government would be able to
exercise virtually unlimited powers with respect to religion.6 9 On
its face, the amici's position seemed to be the proper one. In
essence, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be frustrating the intent of
the decedent's will.70 The Ninth Circuit arrived at this result by
first looking closely at Title VII and its congressional history.7
It relied, in part, on EEOC v. Townley Eng'g. & Mfg. Co.,72 a
prior Ninth Circuit decision in which the Court had held that the
three exemptions for religion provided in Title VII were mainly
applicable to churches or organizations similar to churches.73
This can be disputed, but the Court stated that irrespective of
corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school
... is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion.
The Ninth Circuit found that the Kamehameha Schools were primarily secular
institutions, that the curriculum of the schools did not have much to do with the
propagation of the Protestant religion, and that the requirement that the teachers
be Protestant did not come within the bona fide occupational qualification exception
to the requirements set forth under Title VII. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate,
990 F.2d at 460-66.
67 Id. at 466. Since the Schools' Protestant-only requirement
does not fall within
one of the Title VII exemptions, the court found the failure to consider the teacher
on account of her religion discriminatory. Id.
Joan Biskupic, Court Won't Let 2 Hawaii Schools Hire Only Protestant
Teachers; Justices Spurn Arguments by a Number of Religious Organizations,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1995, at A10.
69See generally Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993) (favoring free exercise of religion based exemptions).
'o Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 466-67. The fact that the
requirement that teachers must be Protestant is found in a will does not alter the
conclusion of the court. Id. The will suggests a personal preference, not a bona fide
occupational qualification. As such, the requirement is accordingly deemed
discriminatory. Id.
" Id. at 460-61, 464. The court noted that Congress conceived § 2000e-1 as having
a narrow scope, exempting only those institutions having extremely close religious
affiliations. Id. at 460. In addition, the language of § 2000e-2(e)(2) and its legislative
history indicate that the exemption is limited to Church affiliated schools whose
mission is to propagate the religious belief of the Church. Kamehameha
Schools/Bishops Estate, 990 F.2d at 464.
72 859 F.2d 610 (9th
Cir. 1988).
73 Id. at 618. In Townley, the Court observed that Title VII
exemptions are meant
for institutions linked to organized religions and whose purpose is primarily
religious. Id. "Churches, and entities similar to churches, were the paradigm." Id.
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that fact, the faculty, student body, student activities and
curriculum of the schools were either religiously secular or
neutral. 4 The Court concluded that the general picture of the
schools reflected a "primarily" secular, rather than a "primarily"
religious, orientation.7 5
Those who filed the amicus curiae brief on behalf of the
schools believed that the Court's use of the word primarily was
very dangerous; they believed it was turning the Court into some
type of theological tribunal.7 6 Yet, in examining what the Ninth
Circuit found in the record below, one is prompted to questibn
the reasoning of those who supported certiorari. The schools had
indeed become, as noted, virtually secular, and the Court
carefully spelled out the secular facts.7
They did not hire
individuals based on religious beliefs, 8 and there was almost no
religious observance in the schools. 79 The Court compared school
literature of 1955 with that of 1961, and then with that of 1990.80
In each case one sees a progressive emasculation of the religious
life and purposes of the school,"' until religion was practically
eliminated. The values have become, among other things, selfawareness and relating to the world 8 2
The Ninth Circuit's message is important to us. The court
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 461. The Court noted that no
religious organization ever owned the schools, and the purpose of the school is not
religious instruction; the faculty, student body, and curriculum is not primarily
religious in nature. Id. at 461-63.
" Id. at 461. The school's primary purpose is to advance moral values within a
general education; it is not to propagate Protestantism. Id. at 465.
" Id. at 461. The Court fails to define "primarily" in its opinion.
77 The Schools' ownership, affiliation, purpose, and
curriculum are primarily
secular. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 461-64.
78 Id.
at 462. Only the on-campus teachers must be members of the Protestant
religion, however, they do not have to be active members. Id.
71 Id.
The only religious activities at the school included daily prayer, prayers
before athletic events, Bible verses reprinted in the schools' bulletins, and Sunday
services during the school year. Id. at 460-62.
60 Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d at 462 (comparing evolving
language from "aim of developing in the students an attitude of worship and
reverence" in 1955 to "provide an atmosphere in which young people accept as their
own the finest ideals of conduct; and in cases where problems have arisen, to show
moral and spiritual standards by which the students can set up inward guidance to
correct their problems" in 1961 to "[diefine a system of values which reflects positive
feelings about self and others and awareness of the rights and responsibilities of the
individual within society" in 1990).
81 Id.
82

Id. at 465 (finding that "a general effort to teach good values do not constitute a

curriculum that propagates religion .... ").
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provided that, to be afforded statutory exemption from Title VII
as a religious institution, the "purpose and character" of the
institution must be essentially religious.s The further a school
departs from that purpose by seeking to perhaps turn an
acceptable face to the secular world, the less it is going to be able
to rely on constitutional and statutory protections.8 In Diocese
of Colo. v. Moses,8 a parishioner brought an action against the
Episcopal dioceses and bishop for breach of fiduciary duty and
negligent hiring and supervision of a member of their clergy. 6
The accused priest, while counseling and advising the plaintiff,
entered into a sexual relationship with her which ultimately
resulted in a relapse and aggravation of the woman's prior
mental illness.
At the trial, the court entered judgment on a jury verdict for
the plaintiff.8
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado
affirmed, holding that, although the court must avoid disputes
involving religious organizations "if the court would be required
to interpret or weigh church doctrine",8 9 the First Amendment
"does not grant religious organizations absolute immunity from
tort liability."9 0 Applying the "neutral principles" doctrine,9 '
which permits the court to apply the state's neutral laws to
religious organizations but prohibits the resolution of "disputed
issues of religious doctrine and practice," 92 the court sustained
the parishioner's claim for injuries. 93 Defendant's petition for
certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court was subsequently
94
denied.

See id. at 460 (relying on decision in EEOC v. Townley Eng'g. & Mfg. Co., 859
F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988)).
" See id. (stating that institution's mere affiliation with religious organization is
insufficient for Title VII exemption purposes); see also Townley, 859 F.2d at 617-19.
Determination of "religious corporation" status, so as to qualify for exemption from
Title VII, is to be done on a case-by-case basis by weighing all significant secular
and religious characteristics to find the institution's primary purpose. Id. at 618.
85 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
8' Id. at 314.
87

rd.

"' Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
90Moses, 863 P.2d at 319.
" Id. at 320.
9

id.

Id. at 321.
114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
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II. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Board of Education of
Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet,95 a case, which has been
widely publicized,96 involving a sect of Satmar Hasidic Jews who
had founded a community in Orange County, New York.
The
Village secured the services of public school teachers to come to
the Hasidic school to offer instruction to children as well as to
aid children in need of special education. 8
Based on the
Supreme Court's decision in Aguilar v. Felton,99 which held
unconstitutional a program through which public school
employees volunteered to teach in parochial schools, 1°° the public
authorities removed the teachers. 10 1 The New York legislature
then passed a law which provided that the village of the Satmar
Hasidic sect constituted a separate public school district.
The
locally elected board was thus empowered to open schools and
hire teachers as they saw fit. 10 3 In this isolated and vigorously
religious community, the residents spoke Yiddish as their
primary language and wore only traditional Jewish garb."' 4 In
many respects, the Hasidic village was very much like an Amish
community. 0 5 The people of the village believed that, as a result
114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
'6 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, High Court Considers Hasidic School Case; Special
District for Disabled Children in Jewish Village Challenged as Church-State
Violation, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1994, at A4; Jacques Steinberg, Court's Move
Elates Village of Jewish Sect, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at B8.
"7Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2484.
9' Id. at 2486.
473 U.S. 402 (1985).
'00 Id. at 414 (finding New York City Title I program, which pays salaries of public
teachers in parochial schools, invalid under Establishment Clause). In Aguilar, the
Court found the presence of "entanglement" as a result of aid provided in a
pervasively sectarian environment in addition to the necessity of continuous
inspection required to "ensure the absence of a religious message." Id. at 412.
95

101Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2485.

102 Id. at 2486. See 1989 N.Y. Laws 748. The statute stated, in part, that the
Village of Kiryas Joel "is constituted a separate school district.... and shall have
and enjoy all the powers and duties of a union free school district under the
provisions of the education law." Id.
103 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.
0o4 Id.
at 2485 (discussing great lengths Kiryas Joel residents take to avoid
assimilation into modern world).
'05See Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas
Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 474-75 (Spring 1995) (comparing
Satmar community with Amish community); but cf Mary Ann Schlegel Ruegger,
Note, An Audience for the Amish: A Communication Based Approach to the
Development of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 801, 801-03 (1991) (exploring adaption of Amish
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of the new law, they had defeated the constitutional problem
because the public school teachers would now be teaching in a
public school district. 10 6 Unfortunately, in a lawsuit brought by
the New York State School Boards Association challenging the
statute on national and state grounds as contrary to the First
Amendment, the New York Court of Appeals found the
legislative action and corresponding policy to be violative of the
Establishment Clause0 7 because its primary effect was the
advancement of religion.1 0 8 The statute's ultimate transgression,
the court said, was its creation of a "symbolic union of church
and State." 0 9 The Supreme Court affirmed by a six to three
margin.1 °
The Court, with Justice Souter delivering the opinion, held
that the statute had the practical effect of creating a special
school district which included only Hasidic Jewish students and
thus departed from the First Amendment requirement that the
state must pursue a neutral position toward religion.'
Although the First Amendment does allow neutrality "which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship",1 1 2 the
Court found that the fundamental principle of the Establishment
Clause, "that government should not prefer
one religion to
3
another, or ... to irreligion," was violated.1
The final relevant case in this discussion is Zobrest v.
CatalinaFoothills School Dist.14 In this case, the school district
had provided Zobrest, a deaf student, with a sign-language
interpreter while he attended the local public elementary
ordinances to "drastic changes within the outside world").
106

Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2486.

'07Grumet v. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel School Dist., 618 N.E.2d 94, 101 (N.Y.
1993).
100 Id.

at 94. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Supreme Court

articulated a three-part test for evaluating the constitutionality, under the
Establishment Clause, of governmental actions. Id. at 612-13. The Court stated,
"[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'" Id.
(citations omitted). The New York Court of Appeals concluded that chapter 748 of
the Laws of 1984 violated the second Lemon principle and declared the statute
unconstitutional. Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 101.
109 Grumet, 618 N.E.2d at 100.
1 0 Kiryas Joel, 114 S. Ct. at 2494.

1 Id. at 2488-90.
"2 Id. at 2464.
113 Id. at 2492.
114 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993).
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school. 115 However, upon his request that, pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Act, a sign-language interpreter be
provided to him by the school district while he attended a private
116
Roman Catholic high school, he was refused and brought suit.
The Supreme Court decided in favor of the boy and his family."7
Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens, dissenting, refrained from
addressing the constitutional issue before the Court,"8 believing
instead that the Court should have initially explored underlying
legislative issues which may have rendered the constitutional
question moot." 9 Justices Souter and Blackmun, enraged at the
120
majority's holding of constitutionality, wrote a scathing dissent
in which they disagreed both "with the Court's decision to reach
[the] question and with its disposition on the merits."' 2 '
The majority opinion has since been the subject of many
differing comments.122 One comment, for example, described the
decision as having a very narrow application, possibly standing
only for the ready availability of state aid necessary to make
learning possible for a deaf student. 23 I think, instead, that a
very different proposition which has been suggested by scholars
in this field is more accurate. It is that two broad principles
emerged from the Chief Justice's analysis. 124 First, that religious
"5

Id. at 2464.

116 Id.
17

Id. at 2469.

118 113

S. Ct. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

"9 Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2469-75 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

121

Id. at 2469 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
m See, e.g., Mardi L. Blissard, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993): An Answered Prayer to Students with Disabilities in
2

Religious Schools, 16 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L.J. 449, 449 (1994) (describing holding

as significant departure from usual Establishment Clause analysis); James J.
Dietrich, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: Equal Protection,
Neutrality, and the Establishment Clause, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 1209, 1213 (1994)
(describing holding as introduction of new standard for Establishment Clause
analysis which resembles equal protection test); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
ConstitutionalQuestions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1994) (suggesting case can be
used to justify avoidance of rule requiring resolution of all other issues before
answering constitutional questions).
123 See Joseph M. McMillan, Note, Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District:
Lowering the Establishment Clause Barrier in School - Aid Controversies, 39 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 337, 385 (1994). Zobrest might thus be seen to apply solely to cases
involving disabled individuals eligible for state aid, with the purpose to make them
productive and contributing members of the society. Id. Entirely incidental could be
the fact that a religious institution was imparting the needed skills. Id.
"A See Dietrich, supra note 122, at 1237.
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institutions are not prohibited from participating in publiclysponsored social welfare programs, 12 5 or more specifically, that
government programs, which "neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion" do
not violate the Establishment Clause merely because sectarian
institutions may also receive some sort of attenuated financial
benefit. 12 6 The second point stressed by the Court was that here,
any such attenuated aid to the religious school would come only
as a result of private decisions of individual parents and not by
government dictation. This private choice, therefore, further
insulated the provision 12of the sign-language interpreter from
1
constitutional challenge.
III. RECENT CASE LAW
I will now briefly touch on some additional cases which may
have an impact in this area. Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.125 is a very important case, and was recently argued in the
Supreme Court. 129 Although factually similar to Madsen, the
125 Zobrest

v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 113 S.Ct. 2462, 2466 (citing Bowen v.

Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988)); see Dietrich, supra note 122, at 1240. Dietrich
states that when "a religious organization performs a function common to a
nonreligious organization, it should be treated equally regardless of its religious
affiliation." Id.
126Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466; cf. Blissard, supra note 122, at 457. Blissard
states
an analogous position echoed by the Court in Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986). Id. In both instances, educational assistance
was offered neutrally to a "class defined without reference to religion," and the fact
that the aid supported an education at a religious school was merely incidental to
any constitutional analysis. Id. at 457-58.
Similarly, in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), the Court found
constitutional an act which provided for the federal funding to religious and other
organizations for counseling family problems and premarital adolescent sexual
relations. Id. at 609. The case illustrates an instance where a religious institution
may be involved in a governmentally sponsored social welfare program without
violating the Establishment Clause. Id.
127 Zobrest, 113 S.Ct. at 2467 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983));
See
e.g., Dietrich, supra note 122, at 1237 (stating that statute passed constitutional
scrutiny because aid provided reached religious school as result of "private choices
of individual parents and not by the existence of some financial incentive within the
statute"); Blissard, supra note 122 at 457-58 (stating that because aid was paid
directly to student, it offered no incentive for student to choose religious school).
128 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
'29 Madsen was argued on April 28, 1994, and decided on June 30, 1994. 114 S. Ct.
at 2516 (1994). The decision affirmed in part and reversed in part the ruling of the
Florida Supreme Court which upheld a broad injunction against anti-abortion
protesters picketing an abortion clinic. Id. at 2530. Specifically, the decree restricted
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Court has denied certiorari in Winfield v. Kaplan,13 ° which also
involved a ban on anti-abortion picketing near a doctor's house in
a residential area. Ward v. Walsh 131 related to a claim of a
Jewish prisoner and the denial of services of a rabbi while he
was imprisoned. 2 The Supreme Court has already denied a
writ of certiorari.1 33 State v. Loce13 4 and State v. Krai1135 involved
protestors by establishing a 36-foot buffer zone around the entire clinic and parking
lot, a 300-foot buffer zone around homes of the clinic's staff members, and by
banning the use of images, signs or placards that could taunt patients approaching
the clinic. Id. at 2521. Recognizing a governmental interest in protecting a person's
right to seek lawful medical care, the court reasoned the injunction could stand if
appropriately tailored. Id. at 2524-27. The Court went on to hold that the 36-foot
buffer zone around the whole building was overbroad as patients and staff did not
travel into the clinic from the sides and rear. Id. at 2528. While the Court did allow
the noise restriction component of the injunction, citing medical reasons, it did not
allow the ban on "all images observable" to stand. Madsen, 114 S. Ct. at 2528-29.
Prohibiting placards did not address the aims of the injunction in terms of
protecting patients, and a clinic could simply pull its curtains to protect a patient
bothered by a disagreeable placard. Id. at 2529. Again, as in Kiryas Joel, the
Justices fragmented, filing concurring opinions and two separate opinions which
concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2530-52. It seems the Court is in
sharp disagreement on issues that raise moral and ethical questions.
130 Kaplan v. Prolife Action League of Greensboro, 431 S.E.2d 828 (N.C. Ct.
App.),
review denied, 436 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994). The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed an injunction prohibiting anti-abortion
protestors from demonstrating at a doctor's private residence, reasoning the doctor
proved a likelihood of success on a private nuisance claim, and that such a
preliminary injunction did not cut off alternative methods of speech and was sought
to prohibit threatening conduct. Id. at 847-48. Although the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Justice Scalia published a strong dissent, to which Justices Kennedy and
Thomas joined. 114 S. Ct. 2783 (1994).
131 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1297 (1994).
at 876. Plaintiff Jason Ward, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner brought suit
132 Id.
alleging that his denial of a kosher diet while in state prison was violative of the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Id. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court below in holding the denial of the use of candles
in Ward's prison cell and failing to provide an Orthodox Rabbi not violative of the
Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 879-80. However, the court did remand the case to the
District Court so it could review factors established in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78
(1987) to determine if the state's denial of Kosher food was reasonably related to the
state's interest in maintaining simple food services. Ward, 1 F.3d at 879. The Turner
factors included: (1) a rational connection between prison regulation and
governmental interest; (2) availability of alternative means of exercising rights; (3)
affect such accommodation would have on guards, other inmates, and prison
resources; and (4) absence of ready alternatives to regulation. Id. at 876 (citing
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
133 114 S. Ct. 1297 (1994).
'3 630 A.2d 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), affd, 630 A.2d 792 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993), appeal dismissed, 636 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1192 (1994).
'
630 A.2d 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991), affd, 630 A.2d 792 (N.J. Super.
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trespass to an abortion clinic which the defense asserted was for
the purpose of saving life. 13 6 In re Kuono137 involved the
dismissal of a graduate student because of the religious content
of his thesis. Capital Area Right to Life, Inc. v. Downtown
Frankfort, Inc.138 related to the denial of a pro-life group's
request to occupy public information space at a Halloween
festival.13 9 The Supreme Court of Kentucky did not agree with
the position taken by the pro-life group. 40 It also pointed out
that pro-abortion groups were likewise barred.14 1 In DeNooyer v.
Merinelli42 certiorari has been denied. 4 3 The case involved a
child who wanted to present a video of her singing a religious
song in public school. The school barred her from doing this, not
because of religion, but because of school administrative needs.]"
Ct. App. Div. 1993), appeal dismissed, 636 A.2d 520 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1192 (1994).
's' Heard together, Loce and Krail involved two individuals who were denied
access to a New Jersey abortion clinic in order to prevent an abortion from taking
place. Loce, 630 A.2d at 793. The two were arrested and convicted for trespassing,
and appealed the conviction asserting, inter alia, that the fetus was an unborn child
and that their conviction criminalized their attempts to save a life. Id. at 794. The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, passing on the question of when
human life begins, held that under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the right to an
abortion was guaranteed and that "[n]o amount of moral conviction as to the
impropriety of the abortion would legally justify the offense or render its
prosecution unconstitutional." Loce, 630 A.2d at 794. Subsequently, the appeal by
defendants failed at both the New Jersey Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court, who dismissed the appeal and denied certiorari, respectively. See
supra notes 134-35.
137 114 S. Ct. 1238 (1994) (denying writ
of certiorari).
" 862 S.W.2d 297 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2132 and 114 S. Ct. 2153
(1994).
19 CapitalArea Right to Life, 862 S.W.2d at 297-98.
140 Id.
at 301. The court noted that the sponsors of the event established a policy
excluding "inappropriate groups" because the organizers had received numerous
complaints from previous festival-goers subjected to similar information booths. Id.
at 298. It then held the actions of the sponsors, which denied access to booths
occupied by both sides of the abortion issue, were to keep with the theme of the
festival, and were reasonable restrictions based upon time, place, and manner, and
not aimed at content of message. Id. at 301.
141Id. at 301.
142 12 F. 3d 211, with unpublished decision, No. 92-2080, 1993 WL 477030 (6th
Cir. Nov. 18, 1993).
' 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
'" DeNooyer v. Merinelli, No. 92-2080, 1993 WL 477030, at *3. The schoolgirl
wished to show a videotape to her second-grade class of a performance where she
sang a religious song at a Baptist Church. Id. at *1. The teacher denied her request
for four reasons: (1) the videotape had not been approved for play as required by
school district policy; (2) the playing of the tape would discourage students from
making live oral presentations, the purpose of the particular program; (3) it would
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Another important case is Bexar County Appraisal Review
It raises the
Bd. v. First Baptist Church of San Antonio. 14
question of whether a state's real property tax exemption
violates the Establishment Clause. 146 At first blush, FirstBaptist
Church looks similar to Walz v. Tax Commission.147 Lawrence v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center 148 involved a Title VII
claim of a nurse who claimed she was discriminated against
because of her views on abortion. In Reali v. Feminist Women's
Health Center,149 the Court had imposed a so-called free speech
zone about an abortuary,'5 0 and this has been protested on free
waste instructional time in the future when other children brought in videotapes;
and (4) the videotape contained a religious message inappropriate for second grade
students in a public school classroom. Id. at *2. In deciding to affirm summary
judgment for the school, the Court of Appeals disregarded the religious issues raised
and focused on the pedagogical concerns of allowing students to use videotapes as
opposed to oral presentations. Id. at *3. The court also stated the "burdens" of using
a videotape that would be placed on the teacher, such as having the tape approved,
previewed, and to arrange for replay equipment, factored into the "style" of the
presentation regardless of the video's content. Id. The court, however, did not
address the content issue, one which clearly evokes religious and constitutional
questions.
'45 800 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 833 S.W.2d 108 (Tex. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1221 (1994).
146Bexar County Appraisal Review Bd., 833 S.W.2d at 111 n.4. The
Supreme
Court of Texas held that a church parking lot could qualify as a place of worship and
receive property tax exemption, even though it leased out the lot to another party
during times the church was closed. Id. at 111. The Supreme Court, however, denied
certiorari without an opinion. 114 S. Ct. 1221 (1994).
17 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court held a New York statute, exempting owners of
land from real property tax who used the property exclusively for religious
purposes, was not a state sponsorship or establishment of religion and therefore not
violative of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 67980. Note that the Supreme Court did not elect to hear the similar issue faced by
Bexar County AppraisalReview Bd. See supra note 146.
148 No. 93-7079 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
149 Feminist Women's Health Center v. Blythe, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub. nom., Reali v. Feminist Women's
Health Center, 114 S. Ct. 2776 (1994), remanded sub nom., Feminist Women's
Health Center v. Blythe, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). Plaintiff, a
medical clinic, obtained a restraining order which imposed time, place, and manner
restrictions on the anti-abortion demonstrations of defendants who, every Saturday,
arrived at the clinic and used various techniques in an effort to persuade or stop
patients from submitting to abortions. Blythe, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188. The Court of
Appeals, Third District, held that free speech concerns could not be used "as a sword
to obtain relief against a private party." Id. at 193.
0 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the California state court decision
in light of the Madsen decision. Reali, 114 S. Ct. at 2776. On remand, the California
Court of Appeal held the abortion protester's conduct was so "egregious" as to justify
a permanent injunction against picketing at the medical clinic. Blythe, 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 196. The court reasoned under Madsen that the injunction did not sufficiently
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speech grounds to the Supreme Court. 151 In Diocese of Colo. v.
Moses, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a relationship
of trust had been violated by the Church. 53 Punitive damages in
these types of clergy liability cases should create much
controversy, since the conceivable misdeeds of church authorities
should not be financially imparted to the entire congregation or
members of the Church.
Lastly, in Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia v.
Rosenberger,TM the University directed a grants program which
The
supported various student organization publications. 5 5
University refused to support one organization because it was a
religious organization. 5 6 The Fourth Circuit held the students'
publication of a religious magazine for campus circulation to be
protectable free speech under the First Amendment, 57 but the
Circuit Court nevertheless stated that the Establishment Clause
would have been violated had the University funded this
religious paper;'5 8 the Establishment Clause represents a
compelling state interest outweighing the free speech rights that
the court said were involved. 159 In an interesting shift, the
hamper the First Amendment rights of the pro-life demonstrators. Id. at 206.
Further, the court stated that their conduct not only physically interfered with
patient and staff access to legally permissible abortion, but also raised anxiety levels
in patients that could prove detrimental to their health. Id. at 196.
.15 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated,
and remanded the
case to the California courts, see supra note 143, the issue is still active and could
very well be appealed to that stage once again.
152863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2153 (1994).
'ss Moses, 863 P.2d at 328-29. The Colorado court reasoned that while "[tihe
clergy-parishioner relationship is not necessarily a fiduciary relationship," it does
"involve the type of interaction that creates trust and reliance." Id. at 322. It then
upheld the jury's judgment against the Diocese for breach of fiduciary duty, while
reversing their finding of the Diocese's vicarious liability, and the ensuing damages.
Id. at 331.
'5 795 F.Supp. 175 (W.D. Va. 1992), aftd, 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir. 1994).
15Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 270.
...
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2514-15. The University's guidelines would not
permit funding for groups that promote particular religious beliefs. Id.
117 Rosenberger, 18
F.3d at 280 ("[W]e easily conclude that the plaintiffs'
publication of religious speech ... falls within the protective ambit of the Speech and
Press Clause .... [D]iscussions of religion are, as they long have been, a form of
speech protected by the First Amendment.").
15 Id.
at 285. The court stated that the university awarding of monies to the
religious paper would be viewed as state sponsorship and, therefore, advancement
of religious beliefs. Id.
'59Rosenberger, 18 F.3d at 286. The court opined that funding the organization
would "send an unmistakably clear signal that the University of Virginia supports
Christian values." Id.
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Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
and permitted
the
use of university funds for religious
160
C
purposes.
The Court reasoned that a public university does
not violate the Establishment Clause when it "grants access to
its facilities on a religion-neutral basis to a wide spectrum of
student groups," even if some of those groups would use the
facilities for devotional exercises. 161 The Court then held that
scrutinizing every type of speech for content would create more
of an Establishment Clause violation than merely62allowing the
university to fund groups on a religion-blind basis.1
These cases contain matters involving interests that we, as
Catholics, would consider moral interests. The docket is far
heavier in religious matters than it was 20 years ago, and
certainly 40 years ago. The variety of cases, of course, is evident.
As one combs through the issues confronted in these cases, one
can see the wide range of questions they raise.

"0 Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2519-20 ("[Tlhe regulation invoked to deny [the
religious magazine] support ... is a denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment.").
161Id. at 2523.
Id. at 2524.

